

Adventure Tourism & the Science of Risk Management

Part II : Applying Systems Thinking to Adventure Tourism













Jeff Baierlein, Director, Viristar

viristar.com

viristar.com/cotr-mast-risk



Outline of Workshop

	Introduction		Presentation 2: Application to Adventure Tourism
	Pre-reading comments/questions		Self-Assessment: Systems Thinking & Risk Management
	Presentation 1: RM Theories & Models		Discussion
	Self-Assessment: Domains & Instruments		Break 2
	Discussion		Case Study
	Break 1		Closure

Application

How do we apply safety science to adventure tourism?

Risk Assessments

SEVERITY PROBABILITY	Catastrophic (1)	Critical (2)	Marginal (3)	Negligible (4)
Frequent (A)	High	High	Serious	Medium
Probable (B)	High	High	Serious	Medium
Occasional (C)	High	Serious	Medium	Low
Remote (D)	Serious	Medium	Medium	Low
Improbable (E)	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low

Safety Culture



Systems Thinking



Limitations of Risk Assessments




▼ Annex A Adventure tourism risk management process


- A.1 General
- A.2 Establishing the context
- A.3 Risk assessment
- A.4 Risk treatment

- Does not correlate with what research in complex socio-technical systems and human factors in error causation tell us about how incidents occur
- Therefore ineffective as a comprehensive risk management tool or stand-alone indicator of good risk management

"...current risk assessment practice is not consistent with contemporary models of accident causation."



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6th International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics (AHFE 2015) and the Affiliated Conferences, AHFE 2015

All about the teacher, the rain and the backpack: The lack of a systems approach to risk assessment in school outdoor education programs

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Abstract

Inadequate risk assessment has been highlighted as a contributing factor in the deaths of several children participating on school outdoor education programs. Further, whilst the systems thinking approach to accident prevention is now prevalent in this domain, the extent to which schools consider the overall led outdoor system during risk assessment processes is not clear. The aim of this study was to determine whether the systems thinking perspective has been translated into risk assessments for outdoor programs. Four school outdoor education risk assessments were analysed and Rasmussen's (1997) Risk Management framework was used to map the hazards and actors identified in the risk assessments. The results showed that the hazards and actors identified reside across the lower levels of the Accimap framework, suggesting a primary focus on the immediate context of the delivery of the activity. In short, from a systems perspective, not all of the potential hazards were identified and assessed. This suggests that current risk assessment practice is not consistent with contemporary models of accident causation, and further, key risks could currently be overlooked. The need for the development of a systems theory based risk assessment process is discussed.

Culture

What is Culture?

An integrated pattern of individual and organizational **behavior**, based on shared **beliefs and values**

Behavior Springs from Beliefs and Values



Actions--like leaves and stems, visible


Values and beliefs--like soil and roots, invisible

Safety Culture

What is *Safety Culture*?

The influence of organizational culture on safety

Specifically: the values, beliefs, and behaviors that affect the extent to which safety is emphasized over competing goals



Evaluating Safety Culture

Characteristics of Positive Safety Culture



Leadership From the Top. Top leaders actively support safety.




Inclusion. Everyone is involved in safety.



Suffusion. Safety spreads through all values, tasks, & processes.



Culture of Questioning. It's okay to question authority on safety.



Collaboration. Staff work together on safety.



Effective Communication. Staff communicate about safety between all levels.



Just Culture. Individuals are not punished for honest mistakes.


Safety culture survey at viristar.com/cotr-mast-risk

Fostering a Culture of Safety

Shift behaviors, by shifting beliefs and values

This is a change management process

Shifting Culture



Just Culture

When an error occurs:

- Don't automatically blame the person
- Look for the underlying systems that led to the error


Focus is on *what went wrong*, not *who caused the problem*

This empowers people to report incidents, and helps the organization resolve the underlying safety issues




Complex STS Theory: Application

How do we apply complex socio-technical systems theory to adventure tourism?



RESILIENCE ENGINEERING



**CONSIDER
ALL RISK DOMAINS**




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MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS**




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
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
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


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
Resilience engineering: create the conditions to withstand unanticipated problems

How?

1. Extra Capacity
2. Redundancy
3. Integrated Safety Culture
4. Psychological Resilience



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
Extra Capacity

- Backup staff available
- Backup equipment available
- Staff trained to operate at level higher than conditions normally require—e.g. Class IV paddler to lead Class III whitewater




Redundancy

- Multiple ways to identify emerging safety issues
- Multiple leaders per group
- Multiple leaders trained in first aid
- Participants trained in first aid, emergency response if leaders incapacitated
- Multiple emergency telecom devices
- Multiple emergency evac options



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Integrated Safety Culture

- Balancing rules-based safety with allowing staff to use their judgement


Psychological Resilience

- Recruiting, hiring, training and retaining staff who have positive attitude towards challenge





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
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


Examples:

- Just culture
- Comprehensive new activity/location/population planning
- Evaluate all domains in incident analysis, incident reviews, risk management reviews



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Risk
Transfer



Incident
Management



Incident
Reporting



Incident
Reviews



Risk
Management
Committee



Medical
Screening



Risk
Management
Reviews



Media
Relations



Documentation



Accreditation



Seeing Systems



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Demographic, Market and Social Shifts



Climate Crisis



Geo/Political Conflict and Instability



Legal trends & precedents





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


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
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Pre-mortem




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
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Self-Assessment

Complete self-assessment 2 at viristar.com/cotr-mast-risk to evaluate the extent to which your program employs risk management models, theories and systems-informed design in its risk management infrastructure:


Uses current models of incident causation/prevention




Employs complex STS theory in safety system design



Identifies and manages specific risks in each risk domain



Employs all applicable Risk Management Instruments



Employs principles of resilience engineering



Addresses strategic risks

